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TOO MANY THEORIES 
Todd D. Rakofft" 
THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT. By Michael J. Trebilcock. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1993. Pp. vii, 310. $35. 
Contract law aspires both to state the law governing actual so-
cial interactions - buying, hiring, leasing, and licensing - and to 
depict an ideal society - the market free and just. Contracts schol-
ars, taken as a group, share these aspirations. It is still an honorable 
calling to fashion the positive law of contracts into a coherent set of 
doctrines.1 Over the last couple of decades, however, a growing 
body of scholarship has addressed the relationship between the law 
of contracts and the desirable social order.2 Being somewhat ab-
stract, this literature has tended to reflect various jurisprudential, 
sociological, and political assumptions. We thus see in contract 
scholarship what we see in legal scholarship generally these days -
a proliferation of theories. In an effort to sort out these theories, 
Professor Michael Trebilcock3 has written The Limits of Freedom of 
Contract. 
Considered as a guide to the scholarly debate of the last twenty 
years, The Limits of Freedom of Contract is an excellent book. 
Trebilcock canvasses a wide range of theoretical perspectives: utili-
tarians, Kantians, social contractarians, Paretians, libertarians, com-
munitarians, and some others all have their say. He also confronts 
a wide range of legal and social topics: prostitution, surrogacy, mo-
nopoly, just price, pollution, mistake and regret, consideration, af-
firmative action, international trade, and many more make their 
appearance. Yet the book does not fall apart; to the contrary, it is 
tightly and clearly organized. It opens and closes with a chapter 
setting out the general themes. In between, eight chapters grapple 
with specific topics: "Commodification," "Externalities," "Coer-
cion," "Asymmetric Information Imperfections," "Symmetric In-
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1967, Harvard College; B. Phil. 1969, 
Oxford University; M.S. Ed. 1971, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1975, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNswoRrn, CONTRACTS at xix (2d ed. 1990). 
2. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Randy Barnett, A Consent 
Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L 'REv. 269 (1986); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Pater-
nalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and 
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. REV. 563 (1982); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
lnalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987). 
3. Professor of Law and Director of the Law and Economics Program, University of 
Toronto. · 
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formation Imperfections," "Paternalism," "Consideration," and 
"Discrimination." Each of these eight opens with a discussion of 
"The Nature of the Conceptual Problem," proceeds to a considera-
tion of instances in which the problem arises, and rounds off with a 
short conclusion. 
Trebilcock explicates the existing literature with great care. I 
have not read all of the works he discusses, but I have read a lot of 
them, and at no point did I see a dismissive or unfair rendition. 
There is one body of work that is 'omitted: because he treats con-
tract law as a doctrinal system, Trebilcock has little time for the 
writings of those who emphasize context above doctrine.4 Aside 
from that, the book gives each major point of view an extended 
consideration across a large range of examples. As a result, each 
chapter, considered by itself, provides an excellent overview of an 
important topic in contract theory. 
What is Trebilcock's own point of view? In the first sentence of 
the preface he proclaims: "I am a law and economics scholar by 
trade" (p. v). Certainly he takes the market society as a given. The 
chapter headings, recited above, by and large reflect the law and 
economics paradigm. And, if there is a leitmotif running through 
the book, it is this quotation from Milton Friedman: "The possibil-
ity of coordination through voluntary cooperation rests on the ele-
mentary - yet frequently denied - proposition that both parties 
to an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction 
is bilaterally voluntary and informed. "5 
By the fifth sentence of the preface, however, we find that one 
of Trebilcock's principal motivations for writing the book is "a con-
cern that much law and economic[s] scholarship is far too unself-
critical" (p. v). By and large, the book lives up to the promise im-
plicit in that statement. As already said, it takes up many different 
social and philosophical theories, and from first to last compre-
hends that "freedom of contract" is as much a political as an eco-
nomic proposition. Moreover, Trebilcock does not assume that the 
analyses offered by law and economics are, in the end, inherently 
superior to the alternatives. Indeed, he criticizes these analyses in 
at least three distinct ways. At times, he faults the use of economics 
in legal analysis for producing hopelessly indeterminate results. In 
considering the problem of externalities, for example, he says that 
4. The most sustained such body of work, that of Professor Ian MacNeil, makes its en-
trance and exit in under a page. See pp. 141-42. "MacNeil's approach," says Professor 
Trebilcock, "no matter how accurately it describes reality, does not yield detenninate legal 
principles." P. 141. 
s. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962), quoted at pp. 7, 102, 164, 
242. 
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the literal Pareto-superiority test6 is almost never met; but if one 
instead employs the Kaldor-Hicks criterion,7 there are a great many 
situations when the empirical uncertainties are overwhelming (pp. 
66, 244-45). At other times, Trebilcock reproaches law and eco-
nomics for being insensitive to important moral distinctions. A 
pure Pareto-efficiency approach to coercion - one that asks only 
whether the parties think they are better off having traded than 
never having encountered each other - will, he says, fail to see 
that, in conditions of pervasive scarcity, we need to make an essen-
tially moral judgment as to which of the sets of baseline conditions 
that induce trade are tolerable, and which are not. The pure law 
and economics view of coercion "would have a very meagre, indeed 
impoverished, content" (p. 84). At still other times, Trebilcock 
takes the economic approach to task for assuming matters too im-
portant to be assumed. He frames the whole chapter on "Paternal-
ism" around the problems raised by the fact that "neo-classical 
economics essentially has no theory of how preferences are formed, 
whether they are good or bad in terms of the welfare of those hold-
ing them ... all preferences are accepted as equally valid" (p. 147). 
All of this is not to say that Trebilcock is picking a fight with law 
and economics, for he makes comparable points about the other 
theories he surveys. It is to say that he does not write from the 
standpoint of a true believer who tries to produce the best defense 
of his own theory at every tum. While the tone sometimes wavers, 
by the end of the book it is clear that Trebilcock -rather takes his 
stand as the intelligent citizen, or the intelligent scholarly generalist, 
trying to make sense of the regime of contract law in a world of 
multiple contesting theories. 
This, Trebilcock concludes in the final chapter, is no easy task. 
On the one hand, the applicable theories are typically so abstract 
that their implications for the law remain arguable. There is, he 
says, a "plasticity to concepts of autonomy, efficiency, and distribu-
tive justice" such that they can s~em to endorse almost the same 
outcomes, or remarkably different ones, depending on the course of 
further argument (pp. 246-47). On the other hand, "nihilism on the 
part of analysts" - "the conclusion that any set of legal rules that is 
likely to be constructed for governing the private ordering process 
is likely to be relatively unprincipled" - is not justified; because 
each of the various theories does represent, at its core, a commit-
ment to a value worthy of, and often commanding, widespread sup-
port (pp. 247-48). He continues: 
6. Does someone consider himself better off, and no one consider himself worse off, as a 
result of the transaction? 
7. Could the gainers from the transaction compensate the losers and still have a welfare 
surplus? 
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Both as individuals and as a community, we do not operate within 
a one-value view of the world .... For economists to claim that they 
are interested only in maximizing the total value of social resources, 
without being concerned about how gains in the value of social re-
sources are to be distributed ... or while ignoring the impact of eco-
nomic change on the lives of individuals or on the integrity or viability 
of long-standing _communities, reflects a highly impoverished view of 
the world. Alternatively, theorists committed only to concepts of dis-
tributive justice, who proceed in their analysis by inviting us to as-
sume a given stock of wealth, or a given increase in the stock of 
wealth, and then asking what a just distribution of that wealth might 
entail, are largely engaging in idle chatter as long as the wealth crea-
tion function is simply assumed .... Similarly, communitarians who 
stress values of solidarity and interconnectedness and discount values 
of individual autonomy and freedom risk pushing this perspective to 
an extreme, where communitarian values become exclusionary, au-
thoritarian, or repressive. [p. 248; footnotes omitted] 
If that is the shape of the matter, how does one determine "The 
Limits of Freedom of Contract"? How can judgment be exercised 
once one concludes that no theory is by itself wholly adequate and 
that several share truth among them? At least three choices ap-
pear. First, one can rely on a weak form of theory: while no theory 
is true all the time, a particular theory is presumptively true, and 
other contestants bear the burden of contrary proof. Second, one 
can treat theoretical truths as additive: given that each theory has 
part of the truth, the more theories that converge on a particular 
conclusion, the more likely the conclusion is valid. Finally, one can 
segment the domain to which the theories apply: while each theory 
is true to some extent, this one applies more to one part of the 
practical world; that one, to another. 
At one time or another, Trebilcock uses all three of these meth-
ods. To begin with an example of the first, he focuses his chapter 
concerning "Externalities" on the question of pornography. Should 
the law support or prohibit a market in pornographic materials? 
The direct parties to the transaction eagerly buy and sell these 
materials, but free trade in them might have baneful consequences 
for others - in terms of direct violence, social subjugation, or mere 
nastiness. Trebilcock offers a comprehensive discussion of the 
many authors who, in recent years, have written about this problem 
from many perspectives, offering quite different answers. (Joel 
Feinberg, Catharine MacKinnon, Cass Sunstein, and Guido 
Calabresi are among those who appear.) His own view, however, is 
that no single theory of externalities adequately resolves the ten-
sion between the direct parties who want to trade and the others 
who object. What, then, to do? 
Trebilcock points out at the start of this chapter that if the mere 
existence of third-party effects 
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should count in prohibiting the exchange process or in justifying con-
straints upon it, freedom of contract would largely be at an end. The 
crucial questions then become (1) what should count as an externality 
in welfare terms, or what should count as a harm to others in liberal 
terms? and (2) what should count as an externality or a harm that one 
may justifiably impose on others? As we will see, the concept of ex-
ternalities is one of the least satisfactory concepts in welfare econom-
ics, and the concept of harm to others is one of the least satisfactory 
and most indeterminate concepts in liberal political theory. [pp. 58-
59; footnotes omitted] 
How, then, should the specific issue of pornography be resolved? 
Trebilcock concludes: 
In the end, I am not persuaded that the case for criminalizing or 
regulating pornography ... is especially compelling, in part because 
the empirical evidence does not strongly suggest any significant causal 
relationship between exposure to pornography and an increased pro-
pensity to engage in violent acts or to adopt negative attitudinal 
changes towards women ... and in part because any theory of egalita-
rian liberalism that dispenses with the harm principle seems to entail 
censorship of a vast array of material other than pornography pre-
mised on a highly patronizing assumption Of false consciousness or 
false preferences. [p. 74] 
There is nothing disreputable in this conclusion. But is it not 
clear that this conclusion depends on assuming that the same wel-
fare economics and the same liberal political theory that Trebilcock 
finds unsatisfactory in their general treatment of the question of 
externalities have, yet, some presumptive force? A presumption in 
favor of freedom of contract pervades this whole conclusion - in 
the sense that a widespread censorship of marketable ideas is un-
thinkable, in that the burden of proof as to causal relationships lies 
on those who assert harm from pornography rather than those who 
deny harm, and indeed in the very posing of the question whether 
there is a case for "criminalizing or regulating pornography." At 
the same time, this presumption is only a presumption. The argu-
ments against it, or the empirical data, could be stronger, and I 
credit Trebilcock's honesty in these matters; in such a situation he 
would be willing to change his mind. The mental operation in-
volved here is not that of applying a clear theory that also clearly 
states its own limits or exceptions; rather, it is that of taking an 
admittedly not entirely satisfactory theory and converting theoreti-
cal doubt into the distinction between actually valid and presump-
tively valid. This, then, is an example - one of several that could 
be adduced - of Trebilcock's use of what I am terming a "weak 
theory" to resolve theoretical disagreement. 
The search for places where more than one theory reaches the 
same conclusion - for convergence among theories as a resolving 
technique - is another approach Trebilcock uses several times. 
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Most clearly, this method forms the framework through which he 
defends his conclusions regarding discrimination - regarding, that 
is, the appropriate legal limitations on the ability of private con-
tracting agents to choose their contracting partners or to vary the 
terms they offer different partners (pp. 188-213). Here, he or-
ganizes his discussion of the existing literature self-consciously by 
theoretical orientation, discussing in succession autonomy or deon-
tological theories, utilitarianism, efficiency theories, specifically dis-
tributive justice theories, and communitarianism. Having noted the 
points of agreement and disagreement among these theories - and 
having reconstructed them, where necessary, so that they address 
specific points such as invidious discrimination, discrimination 
based on statistical generalizations, and affirmative action programs 
- he formulates his conclusion as follows: 
Where does all this leave us? It might be felt that the normative theo-
rizing surrounding the issue of discrimination ... is both ethereal and 
indeterminate . . . . However, the various perspectives canvassed 
above in fact reflect views that are intensely held (albeit perhaps at a 
more intuitive level) by substantial segments of the population in 
most communities, so that we cannot afford to dismiss the challenge 
of developing a normatively coherent perspective on the case for anti-
discrimination laws as applied to private conduct. In terms of forging 
some common ground among these various perspectives, which all 
adopt in one form or another the concept of equality as a central 
premise, I believe that the following set of policy orientations reflect 
the contours of the widest potential range of convergence. First, in-
vidious forms of discrimination should attract strong public and pri-
vate legal sanctions. Even classical liberals, who emphasize the 
centrality of autonomy values, should be prepared to accept a harm 
principle that recognizes a failure to accept the equal moral agency of 
other individuals as a transgression of this principle. . . . The issue of 
statistical discrimination is somewhat more complex, but if we accept 
the importance of social, cultural, and historical contexts, the use of 
either direct or indirect statistical proxies that systematically encum-
ber individual members of historically disadvantaged groups . . . 
should not be tolerated, whether these statistical proxies are on aver-
age accurate or not. ... With respect to further demand-side policies, 
strong-form affirmative action programmes create major moral dilem-
mas for most of the normative theories canvassed above. I believe 
that the ~everity of these dilemmas can be mitigated in several ways. 
[pp. 208-09; footnote omitted] 
This way of proceeding, which may seem simply commonsensi-
cal, rests in fact on a very distinct methodological premise. Of 
course, if all relevant theories honestly can be seen to converge on 
the same practical outcome, as this passage suggests may be the 
case regarding invidious discrimination, there is not a whole lot to 
worry about. But what is the purpose of seeing, in the cases of disa-
greement, how many theories support a particular program, or of 
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recasting the programmatic particulars to mitigate the severity of 
the remaining dissonance? At points Trebilcock seems to suggest 
that the purpose is political - that he is carrying out a task akin to 
a legislative leader counting the votes for and against a proposed 
statute. But if that really were the task, Trebilcock would need to 
provide much further contextual data. So I take it that his true goal 
is to develop the "normatively coherent perspective on the case for 
anti-discrimination laws" to which he alludes. On that basis, the 
claim is, roughly speaking, that theoretical value is additive - that 
a particular conclusion is more likely to be true when different the-
ories converge on it. 
Besides employing a weak theory and looking for theoretical 
convergence, Trebilcock uses a third approach for resolving theo-
retical disputes, that of correlating partial truths with the particular 
domains to which they especially apply. Indeed, in the concluding 
chapter, he offers an extended treatment of one form of this ap-
proach, the form often referred to as "institutional competence." 
Although I do not pretend to be able to offer a meta-theory that 
weighs or ranks these various values [efficiency, distributive justice, 
community, etc.], I believe significant progres.s can be made at a lower 
level of abstraction by identifying the institutions or instruments 
which are best placed, among the array of instruments and institutions 
available to a community, to vindicate these values .... In other 
words, it seems important that we try to think clearly about an appro-
priate institutional division of labour for vindicating these values, rec-
ognizing that they all command legitimate adherence. [p. 248] 
Getting down to specifics, Trebilcock starts by drawing a dividing 
line between "The Common Law of Contracts" and "Contract Reg-
ulation," largely by distinguishing concerns that are situation-
specific from concerns that are systemic. On this basis, for example, 
some parts of the large topic "coercion" belong in court, and some 
in the legislative and regulatory realm. He then goes on to what he 
calls "The Unfinished Normative Agenda" - distributive concerns 
for which neither case law nor regulation provides, in his view, an 
adequate answer. Here, he greatly prefers governmental action 
that promotes the development of human capital and opportunity 
to that which merely transfers wealth, and in a very interesting con-
cluding section - although one that is not very well integrated with 
the rest of the book - he discusses the possibility of building insti-
tutions that will make this new sort of humane governmental action 
a reality. 
Despite the considerable detail of this concluding section, 
the institutional-competence approach, at least as here presented, 
makes only very partial headway toward resolving the conflicts 
presented in the rest of the book. It does serve to shift certain is-
sues away from the domain of the judge - although some of the 
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underlying theories would contest the desirability of even this 
change. But when these issues arrive on the doorstep of an agency 
or legislature, they have not gone away, and Trebilcock does little 
to show that they suddenly have become more tractable. For exam-
ple, in considering from this perspective the point that parties' pref-
erences may merely reveal how they cope with circumstances we 
should consider hopelessly unfair, he initially observes that "courts 
also do not seem well-equipped, in the context of two-party con-
tract disputes, to make generic judgements about historical or social 
processes that may have led to adaptive preferences on the part of 
individuals or classes of individuals" (p. 249). Fair enough. But 
when he turns to generic forms of lawmaking, through legislation or 
administrative regulation, he has this to say about the same 
problem: 
For those who take the view that adaptive preferences are a pervasive 
and serious problem, extensive forms of contract regulation would on 
that account be justified. I am deeply sceptical of, and troubled by, 
this rationale for contract regulation. It has no natural or inherent 
limits if one accepts that most preferences are socially shaped or con-
structed, and at the limit it is a license for tyranny or authoritarianism. 
[p. 251] 
Again, perhaps, fair enough- but certainly a shift of ground! Now 
the very systemic quality of regulation compared with adjudication 
becomes the problem rather than the cure, and the ultimate ground 
for resolution turns on a choice among values rather than among 
legal institutions. 
The upshot of Trebilcock's use of these three techniques - a 
presumptive weak theory, the search for convergence, and differen-
tiation according to institutional competence - is that this book, 
which discusses theory after theory of contract law, is in fact deeply 
untheoretical. Indeed, it is untheoretical in three separate ways. 
First, the very act of discussing theories on the basis that each could 
own part of the truth, or be sometimes the proper theory to apply 
and sometimes not, ignores the assertions of comprehensiveness 
and exclusivity implicit in many of these theories. Utilitarianism, 
for example, claims to cover all social action and, in principle, to 
give mandatory answers - if this contractual arrangement maxi-
mizes welfare it must be enforced, and if it does not, it must not. 
Even theories that may not have a mandatory answer for every 
question surely claim to exclude many of the possible rival answers. 
Kantianism, for example, is not neutral toward utilitarian answers 
- it positively rejects many of them because they treat people as 
means rather than as ends. Indeed, it is a feature of the theoretical 
imagination to have this imperial grasp; it is the very act of follow-
ing thought very far along a particular dimension that gives theory 
its potentially transformative power. 
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Second, whether or not the particular methods Trebilcock uses 
for resolving theoretical disputes are themselves capable of theoret-
ical statement, he does not provide any such account. He does not, 
so far as I can see, provide a defense either of his implicit choice of 
weak theory or, more significant from a methodological point of 
view, of the proposition that a theory that is not strongly true still 
can be employed in a presumptive fashion. He does not provide 
any defense of his use of a method of convergence. He does, as 
already said, make a somewhat extended effort, in his concluding 
chapter, to lay out what he terms "The Institutional Division of La-
bour," but, for reasons already suggested, the effort is not fully 
adequate. 
Third, Trebilcock uses each of his methods episodically. Some 
chapters, for example, give almost no consideration to the institu-
tional implications of alternative formulations. If Trebilcock means 
to employ several different techniques, as he seems to, then his ac-
count, to be theoretically satisfying, must provide an explanation 
for why one technique applies in the one case, and another in the 
other. As far as I can see, he never provides such a justification. 
It might be thought, as a consequence of these points, that this 
book's singular excellence lies in its scrupulous reporting about, and 
comparison of, what others have written, and that its principal flaw 
lies in its untheoretical approach to resolving theoretical disputes. 
But this conclusion depends on the assumption that we ought, in 
the end, to have either a single, consistent theory of contract law, or 
a metatheory that tells us which of several partial theories should 
govern a particular instance. One might go the other way, and say 
that Trebilcock's instinct is right, that in the end we do not want a 
single, consistent, theoretical statement of contract law. On that 
view, the flaw in the book is not its attitude toward its subject, but 
its failure to work out and justify what is in fact a good approach. 
Several things speak in favor of this latter assessment. To begin, 
if we were to seek a single, consistent theory of the matters covered 
by the term "freedom of contract," we probably would not desire a 
theory of contract law per se. True, some of the theories Trebilcock 
discusses are theories of contract - most notably Professor Fried's 
"contract as promise"8 - but most are more general and organized 
along different axes. This is not accidental; what the law treats as a 
matter of "contract" is rather conventional and compounded at 
least as much by history and by particular institutional arrange-
ments as by logic. There is no reason to expect the boundaries of 
any theoretical treatment to match or even to resemble closely the 
boundaries of the legal entity. 
8. See FRIED, supra note 2. 
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If, then, the probable universe of theoretical candidates are gen-
eral social, political, and philosophical theories - social con-
tractarianism, utilitarianism, Kantianism, communitarianism, and so 
forth - we face several well-known problems in using these theo-
ries to decide questions like what background conditions are suffi-
ciently objectionable that contract terms induced by those 
conditions should be voidable for duress, or what information 
known to one party alone must that party reveal to the other party 
before a deal is closed for the deal to be enforceable. For those 
theories that rely primarily on deduction, the logical connections 
between the theoretical abstractions and the particular rules tend in 
practice to be more contingent, or "looser," than the theoretical im-
agination supposes. For those theories that depend on knowing 
empirical consequences, the fixed principles often dissolve when 
faced with alternative and, practically speaking, untestable visions 
of how the world works. Furthermore, for any theory, when ap-
plied to the richness of life, there is always the tug of the story, the 
impulse to respond to the "equities" that lack formal relevance at 
all. Trebilcock often asserts that the theories he addresses are inde-
terminate regarding the matter at hand; this is not an accidental 
feature of the situation. 
Moreover, because the likely candidates are broad social theo-
ries, they are not only contestable on political grounds, but in fact 
are contested.- Perhaps the law could be used as an instrument to 
instantiate the clear victory of one such view. But as a practical 
matter, in the liberal, democratic market societies envisioned by 
Trebilcock, law serves much more the function of mediating among 
different theoretical perspectives than of declaring a winner. Per-
haps a metatheory that would put each substantive theory in its 
place also could fill that function, but that only would remove the 
problem to a yet higher level of abstraction. 
In short, there is much to recommend the proposition that "do-
ing law," or at least "doing contract law," is substantially different 
from "doing theory." At the same time, it is clear from the wealth 
of material displayed in this book that no sensible thinker about 
contract law should tum his back on what can be learned from the-
ory. But if that is so, then it is not easy to say what the connection 
between "doing law" and "doing theory" ought to be. The net ef-
fect of Trebilcock's approach is to tum "theories" into "perspec-
tives" - interesting points of view that show us important angles 
on legal issues. Surely theoretical inquiry should, by taking prem-
ises very seriously and carrying them to their logical conclusions, 
make possible vistas we otherwise, wearing the blinders of common 
sense, would not see. However, this approach inherently rejects the 
claims to systematic truth or validity made by most, if not all, of the 
relevant theories. If we reject those claims as not appropriate to 
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the task of doing law, we need some alternative account of what we 
do propose to do. We need our own, if not theoretical, at least 
methodological account of how we intend to put various perspec-
tives together within the legal enterprise, and of why this approach 
is a sensible way to proceed. 
This challenge faces all present-day scholars of contract law, nqt 
merely Professor Trebilcock. There has been very little recent writ-
ing that, while not adopting a particular social or political theory, 
recognizes the place of theory and tries to give an account of what 
properly constitutes doing contract law in a multitheoried universe. 
Probably the last such effort that is widely known is the work of 
Karl Llewellyn.9 But Llewellyn's well-known solution - "situation 
sense" - self-evidently produces highly contextual results and will 
not serve the purposes of those who, like Professor Trebilcock, 
think it important to maintain contract law as a doctrinal system.10 
In addition, needless to say, the world of legal theory has become 
considerably more sophisticated since Llewellyn wrote. 
This book - The Limits of Freedom of Contract - does an 
outstanding job of presenting the contract law writings of the pres-
ent generation of theoretical scholars. It is a considerable achieve-
ment to organize the idea~ of so many thinkers into one grand 
conversation. The honesty with which the author presents the work 
of others, his reactions to their work, and the bases for his conclu-
sions are all admirable. Nevertheless, even after this excellent 
book, work of a very fundamental sort remains to be done. 
9. I am assuming that Llewellyn's jurisprudence, as most notably set out in KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAWTRADmON (1960), was connected closely to his substantive 
studies in contract law. 
10. For a discussion of Llewellyn's approach, see Todd D. Rakoff, Implied Terms: Of 
'Default Rules' and 'Situation Sense,' in Goon FAITH & FAULT IN CoNTRAcr LAW (Jack 
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995). 
